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Abstract
This paper deals with the optimal enforcement of competition law between merger and
anti-cartel policies. We examine the interaction between these two branches of antitrust,
given the budget constraint of the public agency, and taking into account the ensuing in-
centives for rms in terms of choice between cartels and mergers. To the extent that a
tougher anti-cartel action triggers more mergers and vice-versa, we show that the two an-
titrust branches are complementary. However, if the mergers coordinated e¤ect is taken into
account, then for a su¢ciently large such e¤ect the agency may optimally have to refrain
from controlling mergers and instead spend all resources on ghting cartels.
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1 Introduction
Competition authorities address the challenge of anticompetitive horizontal agreements by
both controlling mergers and ghting cartels. Under the realistic assumption of a limited budget
for the public agency, one may ask how much should be spent on ghting cartels as compared
with controlling mergers. Taking into account the incentives thus provided to rms, in this paper
we develop a very simple framework to determine the optimal competition policy mix between
merger control and cartel ghting.
Firms have been known to adapt their behavior to past decisions of the competition agency.
The most famous example is probably that of the Sherman Act, which, in the words of Mueller
(1996), "ironically, by prohibiting cartels, encouraged rms to combine [...] and thus helped
precipitate the rst great merger wave at the turn of the century"1. Its impact on the rst
merger wave was empirically conrmed by Bittlingmayer (1985). More recently, and based on
the analysis of duration for a sample of international cartels prosecuted in the 1990s, Evenett et
al. (2001) found that joint ventures and mergers are adopted by rms in cartel-prone industries
where cartel formation is restricted. The following real-life example supports this statement:
in 2005 the three main players on the French local urban transport markets were ned for
partaking in an anti-competitive agreement to share the public transport market of urban bus
services during calls for tender2. As a result, two of them, Transdev and Veolia, changed plans
and ve years later notied a horizontal merger, which was granted conditional approval by the
French Competition Authority at the end of 20103.
In our model we rst discuss the case of this apparent substitutability between mergers
and cartels. Then we also consider their complementarity, i.e. the case where rms merge
before engaging in collusion. This possibility is explicitly taken into account by the competition
agencies, which are bound to assess a mergers coordinated e¤ect during its overall competitive
appraisal4. Nonetheless, merger control being prone to errors, rms may sometimes still take the
opportunity to collude after having merged. For instance, on November 9, 2010, the European
Commission ned 11 air cargo carriers e799 million for a price xing cartel that spanned over
1This American example was later conrmed in the UK by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, which
similarly triggered a merger wave by outlawing cartels - see Symeonidis (2002).
2See decision 05-D-38 of July 5, 2005, available on the site of the Autorité de la Concurrence.
3See decision 10-DDC-198 of December 30, 2010, also available on the site of the Autorité de la Concurrence.
4See for instance the European Commissions Horizontal Merger Guidelines - OJ C 31/5, from 5.2.2004,
paragraphs 39 to 57.
2
six years on the European cargo services market, from December 1999 to 14 February 20065.
Interestingly enough, most of the European airlines involved (such as British Airways, AirFrance-
KLM, SAS and Lufthansa-Swiss Air) had previously engaged in several successive mergers on the
European airfreight market6, all of which had gained approval from the European Commission7.
We start by discussing the rms choice to coordinate, and consider rst that they can either
form a cartel or undertake a horizontal merger. The relative protability of the two options
will depend on the probability of a cartel being convicted, as well as on the net private gains
from mergers. Cartel ghting is imperfect in our model, as not all cartels are punished, and
the probability of convicting a cartel will depend on the amount of resources allocated for this
purpose. This amount will therefore capture the severity of this action. The enforcement of
merger control is also imperfect, since the ex ante assessment of horizontal mergers inevitably
gives rise to both types of errors, i.e. clearing welfare-reducing anti-competitive mergers and
banning cost-e¢cient pro-competitive ones. This is mainly due to the asymmetric information
between the competition agency and the merging partners on the true level of the mergers
potential cost savings. Accordingly, in our model the competition agency (CA henceforth) may
be able to identify and prohibit anti-competitive mergers provided it pays the cost of doing so.
The more resources invested in the merger control the higher the probability of identifying anti-
competitive mergers. The latter will thus capture the severity of merger control in our model.
At any rate, given the limited budget of the CA, devoting more resources to ghting cartels will
prevent it from applying a stricter merger control, and vice-versa.
Explicitly, the trade-o¤ we put forward in this framework is the following. The money spent
on controlling mergers enables the CA to screen them and thus avoid some welfare losses from
the ine¢cient, anti-competitive mergers. We call this a selection e¤ect. But this e¤ect comes
at the cost of less intense cartel ghting. This is a welfare-reducing e¤ect, which we call the
detection e¤ect. We derive our results from the net outcome of these two e¤ects in terms of
relative returns for the two instruments of the competition policy, merger control and cartel
5See the European Commissions press release IP/10/1487.
6See the cases M.157/1992, M.259/1992, M.278/1993, M.562/1995, M.616/1995, M.967/1997, M.1128/1998,
M.1328/1999, M.1696/1999, M.2672/2002 and the joint-venture M/2830/2002.
7 Ironically, when clearing the GF-X joint venture for an air freight trading platform between several European
airlines (Lufthansa, Air France, British Airways and Global Freight Exchange Limited - see case M.2830/2002),
the European Commission declared that the joint venture was set up in such a way that it would not lead to any
co-ordination of the competitive conduct of the parent companies on the market for air freight transport - see the
European Commissions press release IP/02/1560 from October 28, 2002.
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ghting. First of all we show that the two instruments, the control of mergers and the ght
against cartels, are complementary, and thus the CA will always optimally spend money on both
branches of competition policy. This result may no longer hold when one takes into account the
mergers coordinated e¤ect, i.e. its impact on post-merger market collusion. This materializes
as a higher likelihood for a cartel to be formed and sustained after a horizontal merger, and
therefore makes the rms strategies of merger and cartel complements. To account for this, we
allow the rms to choose between forming a cartel from the beginning, or merging rst and later
on forming a more stable cartel. In this case, and for a signicant enough coordinated e¤ect of
the merger, the best way for the CA to tackle post-merger collusion is to ght cartels rather
than ban mergers.
This is to our knowledge the rst research paper to examine the optimal competition law
enforcement mix between merger control and cartel ghting. In a related but di¤erent context,
Aubert and Pouyet (2004) dealt with the relationship between cartel-ghting and sectorial regu-
lation8. As far as antitrust and merger control are concerned, the only theoretical contribution,
albeit from a positive perspective, is that of Mehra (2008), which deals with rms choice be-
tween merger and cartel depending on the severity of the anti-cartel action (the ne in case the
cartel is detected).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We rst present the benchmark case of our
analysis, then extend it to take into account the mergers coordinated e¤ect. Each time we rst
discuss the optimal strategies of the rms and the CA, then establish the optimal policy mix
between merger control and cartel ghting. All formal proofs are grouped at the end of the
paper in a technical appendix.
2 Model
Consider the following setting in which the CA has a budget of size r and chooses the amount
of resources to be spent on ghting cartels and controlling mergers. The market consists of three
identical rms: two of them may engage in a horizontal merger9, or the whole industry may
8See also Bensaid et al. (1995), who investigate the optimality of having a unique antitrust authority to deal
with both cartel and mergers, or whether it is on the contrary best to separate the two on account of strategic
information and incentive issues.
9More precisely, we consider a framework where the opportunity to merge is exogenous and the two rms that
contemplate this move are the only ones that may do so, for instance due to some technological complementarity.
Thus we leave aside the outsiders incentives to either merge with them or preempt the merger, since we do not
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instead form a cartel10. The group of two rms is considered as a single player and we assume
risk-neutrality throughout. The cartel is not detected with probability pc(c); where c stands
for the amount of resources spent by the CA on ghting cartels, with p0c() < 0; p
00
c () = 0;
pc(0) = 1 and pc(r) = 0. In other terms we assume that if the CA concentrates all its resources
on cartel ghting, it detects cartels with certainty, whereas if no resources are dedicated to
ghting cartels, there is no cartel detection at all. The cartel provides a joint collusive payo¤ of
C for the two rms which may alternatively engage in a horizontal merger. We do not explicitly
formalize the cartel formation but the cartel stability is captured by the size of the prot C
earned if the cartel is not detected: The higher this prot, the higher the cartel stability. If the
cartel is detected, which occurs with probability 1  pc(c), the ensuing payo¤ for the same two
rms will be the competition joint prot , where  < C . Note that we do not explicitly use
cartel nes, but their role is captured by the lower prot made by the rms in case of successful
detection.
The horizontal merger on the other hand is not only a legal means of achieving coordination,
but also a source of cost savings or e¢ciency gains, denoted by e. The joint prot earned for the
two rms engaging in the merger is then equal to M (e). For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that there are only two types of cost savings, either high (e = e); giving rise to an e¢cient
merger, or low (e = e < e); giving rise to an ine¢cient merger. Both types occur with equal
probability, and the higher the e¢ciency gains, the more protable the merger: M (e) > M (e).
We assume that the e¢ciency gains parameter e is a priori not observed by the CA, but the
latter may however invest m = r  c in merger control in order to investigate the merger project
and thus observe the true level of e¢ciency gains with probability pm(m). By symmetry with
the cartel ghting we assume p0m(m) > 0; p
00
m(m) = 0; pm(0) = 0 and pm(r) = 1: If the true type
of the merger is not observed, the merger is not investigated, and if so, the merger is permitted11.
Finally, the merging rms incur a xed cost k in order to merge. This assumption captures the
fact that coordination through merger is likely to be costlier than through collusion, or at any
rate that merging requires a sunk cost as compared with forming and maintaining a cartel12.
Firms are however heterogeneous w.r.t. the cost of merging, and we assume that this cost is
propose to deal with this aspect of endogenous merger analysis.
10We assume for the time being that the merged entity and the remaining rm cannot form a cartel afterwards.
Such a post merger cartel will be studied in the last section.
11We follow here Sørgard (2009).
12The point worth stressing is that the cartel formation does not require a structural change in the organization
of the partners.
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uniformly distributed on the interval

0; k

: We also assume that k is high enough to avoid
trivial cases where the rms always merge (M (e) C < k); and low enough to induce all rms
to have incentives to merge if the cartel is always detected (M (e)   > k):
In terms of competition policy, the CA maximizes the expected consumer surplus from
both ghting cartels and controlling mergers13. Let wC denote consumers welfare following a
successful cartel, and w the status-quo competition welfare without any coordinated behavior
whatsoever, with wC < w. Concerning the merger policy, the post-merger consumer welfare is
equal to wM (e), where wM (e) > wM (e); meaning that the more e¢ciency gains the higher the
consumer surplus. Moreover, the e¢cient merger is welfare-improving (wM (e) > w), whereas
the ine¢cient merger is welfare-reducing (wM (e) < w)14. However we assume this ine¢cient
merger to be still preferable to the cartel (wC < wM (e)), due to the presence of e¢ciency gains.
For ease of exposition and without any loss of generality, we focus on the possible trade-o¤
between cartel and horizontal merger for the ine¢cient merger projects only, so we assume that
the e¢cient merger is always more protable than the cartel: k < M (e) C : The policy choice
under budget constraint will consist in determining the optimal spending on merger control and
cartel ghting respectively, i.e. the one that maximizes expected consumer surplus15.
The timing of the game will be the following (see the game tree below, starting with the
second stage):
At the rst stage the CA chooses how much to spend on controlling mergers (m) and
ghting cartels (c) respectively.
At the second stage Nature determines the type of merger.
At the third stage, the rms make their coordination choice between horizontal merger
and collusive behavior. If the merger is chosen, they notify it to the CA.
At the nal stage, notied mergers are cleared or banned. If there is no merger, then
the cartel is convicted with probability 1  pc(c) and the market is forced back to its status-quo
13 In practice, mergers get cleared or banned depending on the expected competitive impact, which is basically
assessed in terms of expected post-merger price variation. For instance, the European Commission holds that "a
concentration which does not signicantly impede competition [...] shall be declared compatible with the common
market" - Art.2 of the European Commission Merger Regulation of 29.01.2004.
14See Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Motta (2004) for the welfare-reducing e¤ects of horizontal mergers which
do not generate enough e¢ciency gains, in the case of both Cournot and Bertrand competition.
15Although dealing with the CAs optimal activity level in terms of cartel prosecutions, Harrington (2011)
mentions the possibility of endogenizing the amount of public resources allocated to cartel ghting by considering
a xed budget that the CA must divide among its various activities, such as prosecuting cartels, controlling
mergers and investigating market monopolization.
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competition situation. Otherwise, the industry ends up with the collusive market outcome.
Insert Figure 1
The relevant equilibrium concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and in what
follows we solve the game backwards.
3 Optimal competition policy mix
At the nal stage of the game the CA assesses the consumer surplus impact of the merger
given the available information on the e¢ciency gains. At the third stage, when deciding how
best to achieve protable coordination, by merging or by forming a cartel, the group of two
rms anticipates the outcome of the CAs merger control decision. This means that the choice
between horizontal merger and cartel is determined by the probability of a cartel being detected
on the one hand, and the expected merger control decision on the other. The following lemma
explains the CAs merger control decision, as well as the choice between cartel and horizontal
merger for the group of two rms.
Lemma 1 (i) If the merger is expected to be cleared at the nal stage, then the ine¢cient
merging rms decide to merge i¤ the merger cost k is lower than bk(c); where bk(c) increases with
the amount of resources allocated to cartel ghting (c).
(ii) If the CA observes the merger type, the CA blocks the merger i¤ the budget available for
cartel ghting (c) is larger than a threshold bc.
To begin with, Lemma 1 states that only the rms with a su¢ciently low merging cost
will merge. We deduce that the population size of the ine¢cient merger type increases with
the amount of resources invested in ghting cartels. The intuition is straightforward: the more
money spent on ghting cartels and thus the higher the probability of cartel detection, the higher
the incentives for rms to prefer the merger instead. Thus, the critical merger cost threshold
increases with the cartel-ghting expenditure, and thus more rms decide to merge.
Secondly, if the CA observes the true type of merger (with probability pm(m), where m =
r   c), it will block the ine¢cient merger only if enough resources are left for ghting cartels.
This is easily explained: a merger will be blocked only if the resulting expected welfare is lower
than if the rms are not allowed to merge, which in our model means they will attempt a cartel.
Therefore, for a merger to be welfare-reducing in our model, the cartel ghting needs to be
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su¢ciently e¤ective, i.e. enough money needs to be spent on detecting and punishing cartels
and not too much on merger control.
Going back to the rst stage, the CA determines how much to invest in controlling mergers
(m) and ghting cartels (c = r   m) respectively. Its programme is therefore written as
follows:
max
m
EW (m) =
bk(r  m)
k

 
pm(m) max
 
wM (e);

pc(r  m)  w
C + (1  pc(r  m))  w

+(1  pm(m))  w
M (e)
!
+ (1 
bk(r  m)
k
) 
 
pc(r  m)  w
C + (1  pc(r  m))  w

:
The following proposition gives the result of this budgetary trade-o¤:
Proposition 1 The optimal competition policy always involves both cartel ghting and control-
ling mergers. The optimal investment in merger control m is such that 0 < m < r:
Let us explain this result. First of all, note that it is never optimal to spend the whole
budget on merger control (m < r) since then the CA will clear the ine¢cient mergers even
if the true merger type is observed (see Lemma 1). In that case, there would be a positive
gain from reducing the merger control expenditure. However, spending more on cartel ghting
(c > bc) will soon cause the gain from merger control to become positive, since the CA will now
prevent e-mergers and thus avoid welfare losses. Thus, for c > bc; the CA will face a trade-o¤
between enforcing tougher cartel ghting at the cost of lowering the quality of merger control
(lower m, i.e. m < r). In order to determine the outcome of this trade-o¤, let us assess the
marginal impact of a stricter merger control (higher m) on the expected welfare16:
@EW (m)
@m
=
1
k
hbk0(r  m)(1  pm(m)) + p0m(m)bk(r  m)i :
(pc(r  m)  w
c + (1  pc(r  m))  w)  w
M (e)
| {z }
Selection E¤ect >0
+(1 
1
k
(1  pm(m))bk(r  m))p0c(r  m)(wc   w)| {z }
Detection E¤ect <0
:
16The welfare expression leaves out the expected welfare from the e¢cient type merger since we assumed that
its decision to merge does not depend on the CAs policy choice.
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The CAs choice of allocating more resources to controlling mergers has two opposite e¤ects
on the expected welfare: a selection e¤ect and a detection e¤ect. On the one hand, spending
more on merger control enforcement increases the probability of the CA screening the mergers
and hence blocking the anticompetitive/type e mergers. This is the so-called selection e¤ect,
which, following from Lemma 1, is welfare-increasing for c  bc. This e¤ect captures the marginal
return of merger control, and decreases with the amount spent on controlling mergers. Indeed,
the more money allocated to cartel ghting, the higher the incentive for ine¢cient rms to notify
a merger, and thus the higher the benet from screening mergers. In other words, both branches
of antitrust appear to be complementary, since the marginal return of merger control increases
with the resources invested in cartel ghting. On the other hand, spending money on merger
control always undermines cartel ghting: this is the so-called detection e¤ect, whereby fewer
cartels will be detected and punished whenever the CA reduces the budget allocated to ghting
them. This e¤ect is welfare-reducing and captures the marginal return of cartel ghting. It also
increases in absolute terms with the size of the budget available for merger control. Indeed,
the less money spent on merger control, the smaller the population of potential cartels, since
more rms merge. This is the other facet of the above-mentioned complementarity between the
two antitrust instruments: in particular, if no resources are dedicated to merger control, then
all rms are induced to merge and will actually merge. But then the detection e¤ect would be
nil, which explains why one cannot have a solution where the whole budget is spent on cartel
ghting.
The optimal split in the CAs budget therefore strikes a balance between these two opposite
marginal e¤ects, which occurs for m 2 (0; r) : In other words, the interior solution obtains due
to the complementarity between the two instruments since the CA is always induced to split
its resources between cartel ghting and merger control. We study the robustness of this result
w.r.t. the introduction of post-merger cartel formation in the next section.
4 Post-merger cartel and the impact of merger coordinated ef-
fect
In this section we abandon the assumption that rms choose merger over cartel or vice-versa.
As stated in the Introduction, real life examples suggest, on the contrary, that the strategies of
horizontal merger and cartel may also be complementary, in particular whenever the horizontal
merger is the preliminary stage to an ensuing cartel formation. To account for such situations,
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and to assess their potential impact on the results obtained in the previous section, below we
modify our framework in the following way:
Whenever the two rms merge they will later form a cartel with the remaining rm. It is
enough to replace merger by merger with ensuing cartel in the game tree displayed in the rst
section (Figure 1), to obtain the game tree that applies for the extended model studied in the
present section. The post-merger cartel will be detected and punished with the same probability
as before, 1  pc(c): Following the post-merger cartel, the fraction of prot accruing to the two
rms is denoted MC(e), whereas the consumer welfare becomes wMC(e): The higher internal
stability of post-merger cartels, i.e. the easier coordination when the market becomes more
concentrated (see Motta 2004 and Kovacic et al. 2006, 2009) is captured by the protability of
the post-merger prot MC(e) and by the corresponding consumer surplus wMC(e): The higher
the cartel stability, i:e: the coordinated e¤ect of the merger, the higher the prot and the lower
the surplus17.
The timing of our game is unchanged, and as before, we start our analysis by deriving the
CAs merger control decision as well as the rms merger decision in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (i) If the merger is expected to be cleared at the nal stage, there exists a cost thresholdek(c) such that the ine¢cient merger is notied i¤ k  ek(c). ek(c) is increasing in c if the merger
coordinated e¤ect is small, but decreasing in it otherwise.
(ii) If the CA observes the merger type, the CA blocks the ine¢cient mergers i¤ the budget
allocated to cartel ghting is larger than a threshold ec: Moreover, ec = 0 for a high enough
coordinated e¤ect.
Lemma 2 indicates that the mergers coordinated e¤ect may substantially modify both the
CAs merger control decision and the rms choice between either forming a cartel from the
beginning or rst merging before engaging in a cartel.
To start with, the severity of the anti-cartel ghting may now have a di¤erent e¤ect on the
number of potential merger projects, depending on the size of the mergers coordinated e¤ect.
For a low coordinated e¤ect, an improvement in the detection of cartels induces more rms
to merge, as before. Nevertheless, the opposite obtains for a large enough coordinated e¤ect,
17While empirical studies indicate that horizontal mergers may likewise lead to higher or lower cartel stability
(see Davis and Huse 2009) depending on the future market structure (see for instance Compte, Jenny and Rey,
2002), we focus on the former case, since our objective is to check whether a higher stability of cartels post merger
may reverse our initial results.
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because the post-merger collusion may simply be the very reason why rms decide to merge in
the rst place. As a result, the tougher cartel ghting will reduce the benet of merging, and
thus will deter more mergers.
Secondly, a high enough coordinated e¤ect may make the merger control benecial even if
no resources are available for cartel ghting, precisely because rms may now merge in order to
form a more stable cartel afterwards. Therefore the merger control enables the CA to prevent
the post-merger cartels, and as such yields a positive return even if no resources are invested in
cartel ghting itself.
The objective of the CA is now written as follows:
EW coord(m) =
ek(r  m)
k
2664 pm(m)Max
 
[(pc(r  m)  w
c + (1  pc(r  m))  w)] ;
pc(r  m)  w
MC(e) + (1  pc(r  m))  w
M (e)
 !+
(1  pm(m))

pc(r  m)  w
MC(e) + (1  pc(r  m))  w
M (e)

3775
+
 
1 
ek(r  m)
k
!
[(pc(r  m)  w
c + (1  pc(r  m))  w)] :
where EW coord(m) denotes the expected consumer surplus in the presence of a coordinated
e¤ect.
The next result shows how the optimal policy mix may change due to the possibility of a
post-merger cartel:
Proposition 2 (i) For a small coordinated e¤ect the CA optimally splits its budget between
cartel ghting and merger control, i.e. there exists an optimal investment in merger control m
with 0 < m < r;
(ii) A large enough coordinated e¤ect makes the CA optimally spend its whole budget on
cartel ghting only (m = 0).
In other words, the previous result of Proposition 1 on the optimal budget split between
merger control and cartel ghting remains valid only if the coordinated e¤ects is weak enough.
Otherwise, the CA should spend all its money on cartel ghting only.
In order to explain the intuition for this result, let us once again consider the role of merger
control enforcement on the expected welfare, as described by the marginal e¤ect of merger
control given below:
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@EW coord(m)
@m
=
1
k
hek0(r  m)(1  pm(m)) + p0m(m)ek(r  m)i 
(pc(r  m)  w
c + (1  pc(r  m))  w) 
 
pc(r  m)w
MC(e) + (1  pc(r  m)w
M (e)
| {z }
Selection E¤ect
+
p0c(r  m)
24 (1  ek(r m)k (1  pm(m))(w   wC)
+
ek(r m)
k
(1  pm(m))(w
M (e)  wMC(e))
35
| {z }
Detection E¤ect <0
:
As before, merger control leads to both a selection e¤ect and a detection e¤ect. The detection
e¤ect still involves a lower cartel detection as soon as more money is spent on controlling mergers.
As such, it remains negative. On the other hand, merger control still enables merger screening
and thus avoids some welfare-losses from the ine¢cient, e type mergers. Following Lemma
2, as long as the coordinated e¤ect is small enough, this e¤ect remains positive. Thus, for a
small coordinated e¤ect, the optimal competition policy mix strikes a balance between these two
opposite marginal e¤ects, yielding an interior solution for the optimal merger control expenditure
(m positive and below r):
However, the importance of the merger coordinated e¤ect modies the size and even the sign
of these two marginal e¤ects. A large enough merger coordinated e¤ect increases the detection
e¤ect, because it induces more harmful cartels. This clearly shifts m downward. In addition,
and following Lemma 2, the selection e¤ect is being reduced by the merger coordinated e¤ect, and
may even turn out to be negative if the latter is large enough. Indeed, with a large coordinated
e¤ect, and because a tougher merger control means weaker cartel scrutiny, more rms merge
in the end despite the higher amount of resources allocated to controlling mergers. Therefore
this large coordinated e¤ect makes the marginal return of merger control negative, and thus the
optimal policy will consist in investing only in cartel ghting. In other words, here one obtains
a switch from the former complementarity to actual substitutability between the two antitrust
branches in the event of a su¢ciently large merger coordinated e¤ect. To see this, note that such
a large coordinated e¤ect induces the CA to privilege above all the prevention of post-merger
cartels. But then any policy mix between the two antitrust instruments is sub-optimal, precisely
by not completely avoiding these worst welfare-reducing post-merger cartels. Instead, the CA
may prevent them either by spending all its money on merger control so as to block all ine¢cient
mergers later turning into these highly harmful cartels, or by directly investing only in cartel
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ghting. The expected welfare comparison between these two alternatives shows that the cartel
ghting dominates. This is due to the fact that mergers, albeit anticompetitive, still yield some
cost savings, whereas cartels never do. In other words, the CA is better o¤ detecting cartels
while clearing anticompetitive/low-e¢ciency mergers, rather than banning these mergers at the
cost of leaving post-merger cartels undetected.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the optimal enforcement competition policy mix in terms of merger
control and anti-cartel policies, given that the observation of real-life market behavior indicates
that rms typically react to the current enforcement focus of the competition agencies (either
against mergers or cartels). When studying the interaction between the enforcement of merger
control and that of cartel ghting, we accounted for the resulting incentives for rms, as well as
for the budget constraint of the competition agency.
When mergers and cartels are substitutable from the point of view of rms (i.e. they choose
one over the other), we obtain that the CA will simultaneously enforce both branches of com-
petition policy. This may change if one assumes that merger and cartel are complementary,
as happens when rms merge rst and then engage in collusion. In this case, if the mergers
coordinated e¤ect is large enough, i.e. the post-merger cartel is easy enough to sustain, then
the CA will invest all available resources available in cartel ghting alone, because we show that
the two instruments are substitutes and cartel ghting is more e¢cient.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) The e rms choose to merge i¤ pc(c)
C + (1  pc(c)) < 
M (e)  k ,
k < bk(c) = M (e)   pc(c)C + (1  pc(c)) : This cost threshold is increasing with c :
@bk(c)
@c
=   p0c(c)| {z }
<0

 
C   
| {z }
>0
> 0:
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(ii) If the CA observes the true merger type, then type e is cleared while type e is blocked
i¤ pc(c)w
C + (1   pc(c))w > w
M (e): Note that the LHS of this condition is continuous and
increasing with c. In addition, for high enough c (i.e. m ! 0) the merger is blocked since
pc(r) = 0, whereas for c = r the merger is cleared. Therefore there exists a threshold in terms bc
such that the merger is blocked i¤ c > bc:
Proof of Proposition 1.
For c  bc, the interior optimal choice of merger control spending (denoted m) is dened by:
@EW (m)
@m
= 0
,
 bk0(r  m)
k
(1  pm(m)) +
bk(r  m)
k
p0m(m)
!
| {z }
>0

 
pc(r  m)  w
C + (1  pc(r  m))  w   w
M (e)
| {z }
>0
+

1 
bk(r m)
k
(1  pm(m)

p0c(r  m)| {z }
<0

 
wC   w

= 0;
since the SOC writes @
2EW (m)
@m2
=
( 2
bk0(r m)
k
p0m(m)) 
 
pc(r  m)  w
C + (1  pc(r  m))  w   w
M (e)

+2(
bk(r m)
k
p0m(m) +
bk0(r m)
k
(1  pm(m)))p
0
c(r  m)
 
w   wC

< 0
thanks to our initial assumptions on F; pc; k and pm.
Instead, for c < bc one has that @EW (m)
@m
< 0 following from Lemma 1.
To sum up, the optimal merger control expenditure m is dened byMin (m; r   bc) 2 (0; r) :
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) The e rms choose to merger i¤
pc(c)
MC(e) + (1  pc(c))
M (e))  k  pc(c)
C + (1  pc(c))
, k  ek(c) = pc(c)MC(e) + (1  pc(c))M (e))  pc(c)C + (1  pc(c)) :
Let us now study the monotonicity of ek(c) :
@ek(c)
@c
=
@pc(c)
@c| {z }
<0

264 MC(e)  M (e)| {z }
>0
 
 
C   
| {z }
>0
375 : Therefore @ek(c)@c > 0 if MC(e) M (e) <
C . Otherwise, @
ek(c)
@c
< 0 (meaning for a large enough coordinated e¤ect such that MC(e) >
M (e) + C   ).
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(ii) If the CA observes the true merger type, it will ban the e-merger if
G(c) =

wM (e)  (1  pc(c)) + w
MC(e)  pc(c)

 

w  (1  pc(c)) + w
C  pc(c)

< 0: G(c) is
decreasing in c for a small coordinated merger e¤ect (wMC(e) > wM (e) + wC   w). In other
words, for a small coordinated e¤ect, there exists a threshold ec such that the CA bans the
e-mergers for c > ec (ensuring G(c) < 0). Instead, for a very large coordinated e¤ect, such that
wMC(e) < wC for instance, G is always negative, meaning that ec = 0:
Proof of Proposition 2.
For a small coordinated e¤ect (i.e. for small MC(e)), the optimal merger control expenditure
m is given by the Min(m;r   ec) where m solves the FOC: @EW coord(m)
@m
= 0:
Indeed, for a small coordinated e¤ect (wMC(e) such that wM (e)  wMC(e) < w   wC), the
SOC is satised:
@2EW coord
@m2
=
(w   wC)  (wM (e)  wMC(e))
| {z }
>0
2 p0c(r  m)| {z }
<0
 ek0(r  m)
k
(1  pm(m)) +
ek(r  m)
k
p0m(m)
!
| {z }
>0
  2

(pc(r  m)w
C + (1  pc(r  m))w)  (pc(r  m)w
MC(e) + (1  pc(r  m))w
M (e))
| {z }
>0

ek0(r  m)
k
p0m(m)| {z }
>0
< 0:
Moreover, we have 0 < m < r; since @EW
coord(m=0)
@m
> 0 for such a low coordinated e¤ect:
Instead, the SOC is no longer satised for a large enough coordinated e¤ect. Let us then
determine the value of m maximizing EW coord in that case.
Note rst that function EW coord(m) admits a maximum on the interval [0; r] because the
function is continuous on that interval.
Note also that for 0 < m < r; EW coord(m) decreases with the coordinated e¤ect (lower
wMC(e)): @EW
coord(m)
@wMC
=
ek(r m)
k
(1  pm(m))  pc(r  m) > 0.
Moreover, EW coord(m) is higher for m = 0 than for m = r:
EW coord(m = 0) =
ek(r)
k
wM (e) +

1 
ek(r)
k

w > EW coord(m = r) = wC
As a result, the optimal solution m switches from the previous interior solution to the
corner solution m = 0 for a su¢ciently large coordinated e¤ect.
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